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A Near Electoral Majority 
of Pensioners: Prospects 
and Policies 
WARREN C. SANDERSON 
SERGEISCHERBOV 
EVIDENCE FROM A variety of sources indicates that the age structure of a 
population influences the allocation of public spending. Countries with older 
populations generally spend more on social programs, particularly on those 
that help the elderly. McDonald and Budge (2005), using data from 21 de-
mocracies, found that the proportion of the population aged 65 and older had 
a strong positive influence on government social spending in the 1990s after 
controlling for the ideology of the political party in power. 
Disney (2007), using data from 21 OECD countries from the 1970s 
through the 1990s, showed that the size of the welfare state was positively 
related to the relative size of the population 65 and older. He did not control 
for political factors, but did control for economic factors that could have had 
an effect on the size of the welfare state. MacManus ( 1995) found sugges-
tions in US public opinion poll data that older generations would increasingly 
push for greater government spending, especially on programs helping them. 
Poterba ( 1998) showed that educational expenditures per child decreased 
significantly in the United States as the proportion of the elderly in school 
districts increased. Preston ( 1984), using data from the United States, was 
one of the earliest to demonstrate the relationship between age structure 
changes and the allocation of public funds to programs affecting the young 
and the elderly. 
The aging of voting age populations does not imply that voters will shift 
their party preferences. Rather, as shown in McDonald and Budge (2005), 
the allocation of public spending depends both on the ideology of the political 
parties in power and on the age structure. In the long run, political parties, 
in their competition for votes, respond to the concerns of the electorate. Ag-
ing is now rapidly changing those concerns. A good example is the recent 
legislation in the United States that provides a prescription drug benefit to 
people 65 and older. This legislation was proposed by a Republican president 
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 33(3): 543 - 554 (SEPTEMBER 2007) 543 
544 A NEAR ELECTORAL MAJORITY OP PENSIONERS 
and passed by two houses of Congress, both controlled by Republicans, even 
though the Republican Party has traditionally favored less public spending 
on social programs. 
In the first half of the twenty-first century in many of today's more 
developed countries, the proportion of voting age populations aged 65 and 
older will roughly double. As voting age populations age, the proportion 
of net contributors to national budgets (mainly through taxes) will fall and 
the proportion of net beneficiaries (mainly through pension and health care 
benefits) will rise. Even ignoring health care expenditures, an unprecedented 
situation could arise in many countries in which the number of voters receiv-
ing net monetary contributions from the government would be close to or 
outnumber the number of voters making net monetary contributions to it. 
This is political terra incognita. 
In this note, we take three steps toward understanding the demogra-
phy of this new political environment. We do this by considering the cases 
of Germany, Japan, and the United States. These three countries span almost 
the entire range of aging experiences to be expected in the coming decades in 
today's industrialized countries. In the next section we investigate the effects 
of changes in normal pension ages 1 on the proportions of voting age popula-
tions receiving public pensions and on the waiting time from the median age 
of that population to the receipt of a public pension. We show that intergen-
erationally equitable increases in pension ages could reduce the proportions 
of voting age populations receiving public pensions in Germany, Japan, and 
the United States by 10-20 percent. Even in the case of an intergenerationally 
equitable increase in the pension age, around 40 percent of Japan's voting 
age population would be receiving a public pension in 2050. Without such an 
increase in pension age, the corresponding figure would be around 46 per-
cent. Of course, public pensions are not the only source of support for retired 
people. Private pensions and other forms of savings are also important. 
We focus here on public pensions because voting behavior can influ-
ence them more directly than other sources of old-age support. In some Eu-
ropean countries new public pension arrangements have been introduced, 
called notional defined contribution plans, that mimic some aspects of fully 
funded accounts (Holtzmann and Palmer 2006). Typically, these plans retain 
the pay-as-you-go aspect of the financing of public pensions while providing 
benefits according to schedules that are more akin to those found in fully 
funded accounts. Regardless of which type of account we are considering, 
the problem of having a large proportion of the electorate receiving a public 
pension remains, because voters can always change the parameters of any 
public pension system. 
There are, of course, two ways of reducing the proportion of the voting 
age population who are receiving a public pension or are close to receiving 
one. We first consider increases in the normal age for the receipt of a public 
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pension. We then investigate the effects of lowering the voting age. We do this 
by examining an extreme voting age reform, one that allows parents to vote 
in place of their not-yet-enfranchised children. This reform has been widely 
discussed in Germany's political debate and has been formally discussed in 
the German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag 2004). We analyze it here 
not because it is politically feasible, but because the calculations provide an 
illustrative upper bound on the effects of voting age reform. 
Large proportions of voting age populations in developed countries in 
the future will either be receiving public pensions or be expecting to receive 
one within the next few years. In view of this, it is of interest to ask about the 
remaining years of life expectancy of future voters. If life expectancy shortens 
as voting age populations age, voters may be less concerned with the long-run 
viability of their public pension systems. We show that the life expectancy of 
median-aged members of the voting age populations of Germany, Japan, and 
the United States will change only modestly from 2000 to 2050. 
The effects of pension age reforms 
In Germany, Japan, and the United States, as in many other developed coun-
tries, either normal pension ages are already increasing (United States Social 
Security Administration 2004) or legislation is in place (Foreign Press Center 
Japan, n.d.; Sakamoto 2005; United States Social Security Administration 
2007) to increase them in the future. 2 
In a standard public pension system that is fully indexed to inflation, 
it is possible to establish bounds on intergenerationally equitable changes 
in the public pension age when life expectancies increase. At one extreme 
is the no-reform option (Option I), where the normal pension age remains 
as it was in 2000. This option is not intergenerationally equitable because 
members of each successive generation contribute the same proportion of 
their incomes during their working years and receive, on average, ever longer 
benefit streams as their life expectancies increase. At the other extreme, we 
consider an increase in the normal pension age such that the average number 
of years of pension receipt remains fixed and all increases in life expectancy 
lengthen the time before a pension can be received (Option 3). Option 3 is 
also not intergenerationally equitable. Successive generations pay ever more 
into the pension systems because of increases in life expectancies, only to 
receive benefits over a period that is on average of constant length. 
Intergenerationally equitable changes in the normal public pension age 
must fall between Option I and Option 3. In Option 2, the normal pension age 
is taken as the average of the ages in Options I and 3, and the option provides 
us with an estimate of an intergenerationally equitable change in pension age. 
In Option 2, workers finance a portion of their additional years of pension with 
additional years of pension contribution. Option 2 corresponds roughly to an 
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increase in the pension age by one month per year, Option 3 to an increase in 
the pension age by two months per year (Sanderson and Scherbov 2005). 
The current voting age in Germany and the United States is 18. In Japan, 
it is 20. In our calculations, we assume that these ages do not change. Normal 
pension ages in 2000 are assumed to be 65 years in all three countries . 
The population forecasts used here are a deterministic version of the 
probabilistic forecasts in Sanderson and Scherbov (2005) using the mean 
scenario. Values of the total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth (both 
sexes) are as follows: 
Germany Japan United States 
Year TFR e. TFR e. TFR e. 
2000 I .4 77.7 1.4 8 I. I 2. I 76 .9 
2025 1.4 82.8 1.4 86.2 2.0 81.8 
2050 1.5 87.9 1.5 91.3 1.9 86.9 
Table 1 shows the percentages of voting age populations at or above the 
normal pension ages for each of the three options. By 2050, adopting Option 
2 causes the percentage of people of pension age in the voting age popula-
tion to fall by 7 percentage points in Germany, from 39 (under Option 1) to 
32 percent, by 6 percentage points in Japan, from 46 to 40 percent, and by 
5 percentage points in the United States, from 29 to 24 percent. Note, how-
ever, that even with this pension age reform, the percentage of the voting 
age population at or above the normal pension age in Japan almost doubles 
from 2000 to 2050. 
Table 2 provides a different perspective on the effects of pension age re-
form. By 2050, without further changes in the normal pension age, a majority 
of the Japanese voting age population would be either receiving a pension or 
TABLE I Percentage of voting age population at or above the normal 
pension age under three options, (1) no change in normal pension age, 
(2) normal pension age increases one month per year, and (3) normal 
pension age increases two months per year: Germany, Japan, and the 
United States 2000-50 
Germany Japan United States 
Year Opt. I Opt. 2 Opt. 3 Opt. 1 Opt. 2 Opt. 3 Opt. I Opt. 2 Opt.3 
2000 20.l 20 .1 20.I 21.7 21.7 21.7 16 .6 16.6 16.6 
2010 24.4 23.3 22.l 27.5 26.3 25.0 16.9 16.2 15.4 
2020 26.7 24.I 21.6 34. l 31.9 29 .5 20.9 18.9 17.0 
2030 32.8 27 .8 23.2 36.6 33.0 29.7 25.7 22.7 I 9.8 
2040 37.0 32.4 26.8 42.2 36.1 30.4 27.4 24.0 20.5 
2050 38.6 32.3 26 .4 46.4 40.2 33.6 28.5 23 .9 19 .5 
NOTE: See text for funher discussion of options. 
SOURCE: Figures are computed from the mean scenario in Sanderson and Scherbov (2005). 
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TABLE 2 Waiting time (in years) from median age of voting age population 
to normal pension age under three options, (1) no change in normal pension 
age, (2) normal pension age increases one month per year, and (3) normal 
pension age increases two months per year: Germany, Japan, and the United 
States 2000-50 
Germany Japan United States 
Year Opt. 1 Opt. 2 Opt. 3 Opt. 1 Opt. 2 Opt. 3 Opt. 1 Opt. 2 
2000 18.8 20.5 22 .6 15 .8 17.2 18.8 21.7 23.3 
2010 16 .2 18.7 21 .6 13 .2 l 5.1 17.4 19.4 21.6 
2020 12.5 15.5 19 . I 10.8 13 .4 16 .4 18 .0 20.8 
2030 10.2 13 .9 18.4 7 .8 11.0 14.8 16.9 20.4 
2040 8.9 13.4 18 .9 4.5 8.3 12 .8 15 .6 19 .8 
2050 7.3 12 .5 18 .9 2.4 6.9 12.3 14.5 19.4 
NOTE: See text for further discussion of options. 
SOURCE: Figures are computed from the mean scenario in Sanderson and Scherbov (2005). 
within 2.4 years of doing so, assuming that no one receives an early public 
pension for disability or other reasons. Allowing for early pensions, it is clear 
that more than half of Japan's voting age population could be net beneficiaries 
of government expenditures some time around mid-century. Under Option 
2, a majority of the Japanese voting age population in 2050 will be either 
above the normal pension age or within 6.9 years of receiving a public pen-
sion, again not allowing for any early pension recipients. 
Without further increases in the normal pension age, a majority of the 
German voting age population in 2050 would be either receiving a public pen-
sion or within 7 .3 years of receiving one, again not taking early pensions into 
account. Early pensions have been popular in Germany and if they are not 
curtailed, Germany could, like Japan, have a majority of its voting age popu-
lation as net beneficiaries of government expenditures around mid-century. 
Assuming Option 2, a majority of the German voting age population would 
either be above the normal pension age or within 12.5 years of it. 
The normal pension age is already increasing in the United States rough-
ly in line with Option 2, although additional legislation would be needed to 
continue the pension age increases in the future . In 2000, a majority of the 
US voting age population was above the normal pension age or within 21. 7 
years of it. Under Option 2, that would change only marginally. The interac-
tion between aging and politics is likely to be much less of a problem in the 
United States than in other developed democracies. This is consistent with 
Bergstrom and Hartman's (2005) demonstration of the political feasibility in 
the United States of a policy of increasing the normal pension age by one-
eighth of a year per calendar year. This implied path of normal pension ages 
would be roughly halfway between our Options 2 and 3. 
Pension age reforms, while useful for the sustainability of pension sys-
tems, will not, by themselves, prevent significant increases in the proportion 
Opt. 3 
25.1 
24.1 
24.1 
24.6 
24.8 
25.3 
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of voting age populations who are net beneficiaries of government expendi-
tures, especially in countries like Germany and Japan. Pension reforms, which 
do not include raising the normal pension age, can also be useful in main-
taining the stability of pension systems, but they do not address the political 
problem of electoral majorities voting on their own pension levels. 
Voting age reform: Demeny voting 
In addition to increasing the normal pension age, proportions of voting age 
populations receiving or being close to receiving a public pension can be re-
duced by lowering the voting age . There are many possible reforms of voting 
age regulations. Here we consider a radical proposal, giving parents the right 
to vote as proxies for their children who are too young to vote themselves. 
We call this "Demeny voting," after Paul Demeny who suggested it (Demeny 
1986). Demeny voting has recently been under active discussion in Germany 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2004; Weimann 2002) . It is of interest to us here pri-
marily because it is an extreme case of voting age reform. Politically feasible 
forms of voting age reform will have much less impact. 
Demeny voting requires that we redefine the voting age population as 
the population at or above the legal minimum age for voting weighted by the 
factor one plus the number of children in each person's custody. For simplic-
ity, we can think of women voting for all their underage female children and 
men for their underage male children. 
As can be seen from Table 3, Demeny voting in Germany with no fu-
ture changes in the normal pension age would result in the proportion of the 
Demeny voting age population at or above the normal pension age in 2050 
of 33. l percent. In the absence of Demeny voting, the proportion of the vot-
ing age population in that age group would be 38.6 percent (see Table 1 ). In 
2000 (without Demeny voting) , the proportion was 20. l percent. For such 
an extreme voting age reform, the change in the proportion at or above the 
normal pension age of only 5.5 percentage points may seem small: it reflects 
the prevailing low fertility, hence the low proportion of the population below 
the normal voting age. Indeed, more modest reforms would have even more 
modest results. 
Demeny voting in Germany combined with Option 2 with respect to the 
pension age reform would result in the percentage of the Demeny voting age 
population at or above the normal pension age rising to around 28 percent 
by 2040 and then stabilizing. This combination of policies could simultane-
ously serve a number of purposes . The increase in the normal pension age 
would help make the pension system sustainable and decrease the proportion 
of possible votes cast by those at or above the normal pension age. Further, 
Demeny voting could be one among a set of policies aimed at supporting 
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TABLE 3 Percentage of voting age population above normal pension age 
in 2000, and percentage of total population above normal pension age 
with Demeny voting under three options, (I) no change in normal pension 
age, (2) normal pension age increases one month per year, and (3) normal 
pension age increases two months per year: Germany, Japan, and the United 
States 2010-50 
Percentage of voting age population above normal pension age 
Year Germany Japan United States 
2000 20.1 21.7 16.6 
Percentage of total population above normal pension age with Demeny voting 
Germany Japan United States 
Opt. I Opt. 2 Opt. 3 Opt. I Opt. 2 Opt. 3 Opt. I Opt. 2 Opt. 3 
2010 20.4 19.5 18.5 22.4 21.4 20.4 12 .8 12.2 11.7 
2020 22.6 20.4 18.2 28.4 26 .5 24.5 16.1 14.5 13 . I 
2030 27.8 23.6 19.7 31.! 28.l 25.2 20.0 17.6 15.4 
2040 31.7 27.8 23.0 36.0 30.8 26.0 21.5 18.9 16.1 
2050 33.1 27.7 22.7 39.8 34.5 28.9 22.6 18.9 15.4 
NOTES: Figures for 2000 do not take Demeny voting into account. Calculation treats the total population as if it were the 
Demeny voting age population. This is a close approximation, but it does produce a slight downward bias in the percent-
ages, especially for Japan under Option I . This is consistent with our interpretation of the Demeny voting results as show-
ing the maximum possible effect of a voting age reform. See text for further discussion of options . 
SOURCE: Figures are computed from the mean scenario in Sanderson and Scherbov (2005). 
higher fertility . (Feedback arising from this source is not taken into account 
in our calculations on the effects of voting reform: they reflect only the TFR 
assumptions specified in the text table on page 546.) 
The situation in Japan is similar. Adding Demeny voting to Option 2 
would reduce the percentage at or above the normal pension age in 2050 
from 40.2 to 34.5 percent. Without both changes it would be 46.4 percent. 
Changing the normal pension age by about one month per year has roughly 
the same effect on the percent of the voting age population at or above the 
normal pension age in 2050 as allowing parents to vote for all their not-yet-
enfranchised children. 
In the United States, increases in the normal pension age already being 
applied roughly follow Option 2 through 2027. If the United States contin-
ues on that path, around 23.9 percent of the voting age population will be 
at or above the normal pension age in 2050, up from 17 percent in 2000. If 
Demeny voting is added to the mix, the percentage rises only to 18. 9 percent 
at mid-century. 
More politically feasible voting age reforms, such as reducing voting 
ages by two years, would have only marginal effects on the proportions of the 
voting age population above or near the normal pension age. Indeed, even 
with Demeny voting, without further reforms in the age of pension receipt, 
the proportion of Japan's voting age population receiving a public pension 
would increase by around 65 percent between 2000 and 2050. 
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The life expectancies of voters could influence how they evaluate the desir-
ability of policies with long-run payoffs compared with those having short-
term payoffs. In an era of increasing life expectancies, people of any particular 
age in the future will have longer remaining life expectancies than people of 
the same age today. The change in life expectancy of the median-aged person 
in the voting age population depends on how fast the median age changes 
over time compared with how fast remaining life expectancy increases. 
Of course, most people do not know their life expectancies; neverthe-
less, they plan for their future. In doing so, they get information from a wide 
variety of sources including financial advisors, their doctors, the media, and 
their own observations. On average, all of these inputs would lead adults of 
any given age to make their plans about the future on the basis of longer time 
horizons than people of the same age a generation earlier. Evidence shows 
that the subjective probabilities of survival used in making those future plans 
( 1) are consistent with life table probabilities when they are aggregated by 
age (Hurd and McGarry 1995), (2) change as predicted with new health in-
formation (Hurd and McGarry 2002), and ( 3) are associated as expected with 
patterns of saving and consumption (Salm 2006). 
In order to provide an indicator of life expectancy that can be compared 
with a population's median age, Table 4 shows the age of an individual in 
the year 2000 who has the same remaining life expectancy as a person at the 
median age of the voting age populations of Germany, Japan, and the United 
States in the years 2010-50. This type of age measure was first introduced in 
Sanderson and Scherbov (2005) and is robust to whether it is measured using 
period or cohort life tables (Sanderson and Scherbov 2007). 
We forecast the median age of a member of Germany's voting age popu-
lation in 2050 to be around 58. Because of increases in life expectancy, he or 
she will have the same life expectancy as a 48-year-old German in 2000. Since 
the median-aged member of Germany's voting age population was 46 years 
in 2000, the life expectancy of Germany's median-aged voting age popula-
tion member will barely budge during the first half of the century. Most of 
the increase in the median age of Germany's voting age population is likely 
to be offset by an increase in life expectancy. 
Japan's voting age population will age faster than Germany's, but still 
increases in life expectancy are expected to offset the better part of the in-
crease in the median age of the country's voting age population. The voting 
age population in the United States will age more slowly, and life expectancy 
increase will probably outpace it. An individual at the median age of the US 
voting age population in 2050 will have the same life expectancy as a 42-year-
old in 2000, which is slightly less than the observed median age of the vot-
ing age population in that year. Generally speaking, because life expectancy 
TABLE 4 Median age of voting age population and age of a person in 2000 who would have the same life expectancy as a 
person at the median age in the specified year: Germany, Japan, and United States, ten-year intervals 2000-50 
Germany Japan United States 
Age of a person in 2000 Age of a person in 2000 Age of a person in 2000 
Median who would have the same Median who would have the same Median who would have the same 
age of life expectancy as a person age of life expectancy as a person age of life expectancy as a person 
voting age at the median age of the voting age at the median age of the voting age at the median age of the 
Year population voting age population population voting age population population voting age population 
2000 46.2 46.2 49.2 49.2 43.3 43.3 
2010 48 .8 46.8 51.8 49.9 45.6 44.0 
2020 52.5 48.6 54.2 50.5 47.1 43 .7 
2025 54.2 49.3 55.5 51.0 47.5 43.2 
2030 54.9 49.0 57.2 51.8 48.l 43.0 
2040 56.l 48.5 60.5 53.5 49.2 42.6 
2050 57.7 48.2 62.6 53 .7 50.5 41.7 
NOTE: All figures are for both sexes combined. 
SOURCE: Figures are median values computed over 1,000 probabilistic forecasts. See Sanderson and Scherbov (2005) and Lutz. Sanderson, and Scherbov (200 l). 
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increases in most developed countries are likely to be similar in magnitude 
to anticipated increases in the median ages of voting age populations, life 
expectancies at those median ages are not forecasted to change much during 
the period up to 2050. To the extent that interest in policies with longer-term 
payoffs is influenced by those life expectancies, we would not expect the in-
terest in those policies to change much either. In particular, even with large 
increases in proportions of voting age populations receiving or being close 
to receiving a public pension, we would not expect interest in a sustainable 
public pension system to diminish. 
Discussion 
The voting age population and the voting population are not the same. They 
differ for two main reasons . First, age-specific voting participation rates differ. 
Typically, younger people vote less often than older people. Second, some 
people in the population are not citizens and therefore not eligible to vote. In 
the United States, the median age of voters in the 2004 presidential election 
was about 3.5 years older than the median age of the voting age population 
(US Census Bureau 2006). In national elections around 2000 in Japan, the 
difference was similar (AARP Global Aging Program, n.d.). In Germany the 
difference was about two years (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2003 ). 
It is not clear whether these differences will persist or how they might change. 
If the median age of Japanese voters remained around 3. 5 years higher than 
the median age of the voting age population, then the median age of Japanese 
voters in 2050 would be close to 65. In the short run, at least, we would ex-
pect that the median voter would remain a few years older than the median 
member of the voting age population. 
We do not think that it is in the interest of pensioners to block all public 
pension reforms. Pensioners and the young are natural allies on the issue of 
raising the normal pension age. Pensioners have an interest in raising the 
pension age for others, because it leaves more money available for themselves 
and because it lowers pressure to reduce their benefits. Raising the normal 
pension age would mean lower taxes for the working-age population. This is 
also in the interest of pensioners, with their long life expectancies, because 
it is not in their interest to raise taxes on workers to unsustainable levels. 
Therefore, in some countries it might be easier to pass pension age reform 
when the voting age population is much older than it is now rather than in 
the near term when a substantial fraction of the voting age population would 
be looking forward to soon receiving a public pension. Still, by that time, it 
might be rather late for pension age reform to help maintain the sustainability 
of the pension system itself. 
As we move toward mid-century, we will be entering new political ter-
rain. Without further reforms, some wealthier countries are likely to have 
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a majority or near majority of their electorates receiving public pensions by 
2050. Crucial steps to reduce potential future problems could be much easier 
to take now than they will be in a few decades (Sinn and Uebelmesser 2003; 
Uebelmesser 2004). Demographic analysis has an important role to play here 
both by showing what our future is likely to be in the absence of additional 
reforms and by quantifying the effects of our policy options. 
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